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VanSickle: A Compromise in the Fresh Tomato Trade Dispute

A COMPROMISE IN THE FRESH TOMATO TRADE
DISPUTE
John J. VanSickle*

The most recent trade dispute with Mexico in the fresh tomato market
was resolved on October 28, 1996, when Mexican growers signed a
suspension agreement with the U.S. government.' The agreement specifies
that Mexican shippers will not sell fresh tomatoes for less than 20.68
cents/pound (US$5.17 per 25 pound equivalent) and that they will not dump
tomatoes on the U.S. market.2 This agreement is historic in that it is the
first agreement of its kind for the produce industry. It has the potential to
give both U.S. and Mexican growers access to a profitable U.S. market.
The trade dispute with Mexico has long been a problem within the
produce industry. Mexico became a major player in the market following the
embargo placed on Cuba in 1962. 3 The removal of Cuba from the U.S.
market opened a window of opportunity that Mexican growers and shippers
seized. Mexico increased shipments of fresh tomatoes to the United States
and eroded Florida's market share to the point where Florida producers filed
their first antidumping petition in 1978.' That petition was withdrawn at the
urging of the Carter Administration,5 but was resubmitted the following year
when increased imports continued to depress returns to Florida growers.6
The U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) did not identify dumping in
that case when it used the third country test to show that Mexican tomatoes
were not being sold in the United States below the price that Mexican
tomatoes were being sold in Canada.7 Mexico did shift its policy toward
produce imports following that decision. Mexico managed their trade over the

* Professor, Food & Resource Economics Department, IFAS, University of Florida.
1. Suspension of Antidumping Investigation: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg.
56,618 (1996) [Suspension: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico].
2. Id. at 56,620.
3. John VanSickle, Florida Tomatoes in a Global Market, 108 PROC. FLA. TOMATO
INST. 1 (1996).
4. Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables from Mexico: Termination of Antidumping
Investigation, 44 Fed. Reg. 43,567 (1979).
5. Id.
6. Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables from Mexico: Antidumping Proceeding Notice and
Tentative Determination of Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value, 44 Fed. Reg 63,588 (1979).
7. Certain Fresh Winter Vegetable from Mexico: Final Determination of Sales at Not
Less Than Fair Value, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,512 (1980).
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decade of the 1980s and early 1990s by imposing minimum quality standards
that had the effect of controlling the volume of produce they shipped to U.S.
and Canadian markets. While U.S. and Mexican growers experienced short
periods of low prices, the intensity of competition was much less than it had
been.9
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),' ° implemented
in 1994, brought on a new chapter in the competition between Mexican and
U.S. producers. Provisions of NAFIA were intended to eliminate tariff and
nontariff barriers that alter the competitive position between countries. 1'
The three major provisions relating to tomatoes were: (1) elimination of
tariffs over a ten-year transition period, (2) liberalization of the transportation
sector, and (3) removal of barriers to investment. 12 Through 1997, the tenyear transition period for removal of tariffs has resulted in a thirty percent
decline in the tariff rate collected on Mexican tomatoes as they cross into the
United States. 13 This provision has resulted in a decline of only US$0.15
per twenty-five pound carton equivalent in the winter market for fresh
tomatoes. 4 This provision has had a small impact on the comparative
advantage for Mexican producers.
Liberalization of the transportation sector was to have begun in 1996,
allowing direct transport of products within the bordering states of the United
States and Mexico.' 5 Total liberalization was to have occurred in the year
16
2000 with direct transportation to any points within the two countries.
This provision held the potential of eliminating the significant costs
associated with off loading of produce at the border and the handling of the
products by merchants set up to sell Mexican products in the United States.
The first phase of this liberalization has been delayed because of concerns
about the safety of Mexican trucks and security surrounding drug trafficking.' 7 Mexico remains the number one transhipment point for illicit drugs
entering the United States. Safety inspections of 23,766 Mexican trucks at

8. VanSickle, supra note 3, at 1, 3.
9. Id.; see also Kenrick Jordan & John VanSickle, NAFTA and FloridaTomatoes: How
Will FloridaGrowers Survive?, 108 PRoc. FLA. STATE HORT. Soc. 297, 298 (1995).
10. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA].
11. VanSickle, supra note 3, at 1-2.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2.
14. JOHN J. VANSICKLE ET AL., COMPETITION IN THE U.S. WINTER FRESH VEGETABLE
INDUSTRY 64 (USDA, Econ. Res. Serv., Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 691, 1994).
15. VanSickle, supra note 3, at 2; see NAFTA, supra note 10, annex I (Reservations for
Existing Measures and Liberalization Commitment, Schedule of the United States, Schedule
of Mexico).
16. VanSickle, supra note 3, at 2.
17. Id.
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the border through August 23, 1996 resulted in 10,088 vehicles being placed
"Out of Service" (OOS), or 42% of all trucks inspected.1 8 A total of 2766
drivers (12%) on these trucks were placed OOS.' 9 Mexican drivers were
most often placed OOS because of invalid licenses.2 ° Mexican vehicles
were placed OOS most often because of problems with tires, lighting, brakes,
suspension, wheels, and fuel systems. 2 ' Negotiations continue between the
Clinton Administration and Mexico to bring the NAFTA transportation
provisions back on track, but so far the Clinton Administration has remained
steadfast in its opposition to transportation liberalization until the safety and
security issues are addressed. 22 New vehicle inspection systems and hightechnology drug enforcement systems are being developed to improve the
confidence in Mexican vehicles entering U.S. highways. Full implementation
of the NAFTA transportation provisions by the year 2000 continues to be a
goal.
Investment provisions within NAFTA and policy changes in Mexico have
had significant effects on the comparative advantage of Mexican producers
of fresh produce. United States growers have long held an advantage in the
U.S. market for fresh produce because of their proximity to the market and
because of the rapid development and adoption of new technology.
Investment provisions within NAFTA have given foreign investors more
security and resulted in significant investment in the Mexican produce
industry.2 3 The advantage U.S. growers once held in technology has
diminished, and this has been argued by Mexico to be one of the main
reasons for their increased presence in the U.S. market.
A greater impact on competitive position has been felt because of the
large peso devaluation beginning in December 1994.24 Prior to NAFTA,
Mexican macroeconomic policies had lowered inflation in Mexico and
brought relative stability to the Mexican peso. 25 The peso became overvalued in the early 1990s because policymakers in Mexico controlled the rate
of devaluation. The peso was allowed to float beginning in December 1994,
and was devalued from 3.4 new pesos to the U.S. dollar to 6.7 new pesos to
the U.S. dollar in March 1995, a devaluation of almost fifty percent. 26 This
devaluation had two effects: first, it lowered the effective cost of production

18.
United
19.
20.

Discussion with U.S. Dep't of Transportation, who monitor trucks that enter the
States.
Id.
Id.

21. Id.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
NAFTA, supra note 10, pt. 3, ch. 11 (Investment).
VanSickle, supra note 3, at 3.
Id.
Id.
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for Mexican producers, giving them an artificial advantage in the U.S.
market, and second, it made it more difficult for Mexican consumers to buy
the thirty percent of production that they were buying from Mexican growers
prior to December 1994, which diverted much of that product to the U.S.
markets. 27 The devaluation led to a surge of Mexican imports of fresh
produce and caused lower prices for both Mexican and U.S. shippers.
Increased imports and depressed prices resulted in a petition seeking
relief from increased imports of fresh tomatoes that was filed in March 1995,
with the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) under Section 201 of the
Trade Act of 1974.28 A Section 201 petition allows U.S. growers to seek
relief from surges of imports that cause serious injury to the U.S. industry.29
Section 202(d) of the Act allows growers of perishable agricultural products
to seek provisional relief pending the completion of a full 180-day ITC
investigation and the 60-day Presidential review period.30 An affirmative
provisional relief determination requires that ITC find two conditions present:
(1) on the basis of available information, increased imports of the subject
article are a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the
domestic industry, and (2) the serious injury is likely to be difficult to repair
or cannot be timely prevented by final relief.31 The Trade Act of 1974 was
amended in 1988 to include Section 202(d) as a concession to fresh fruit and
vegetable growers.32
The ITC ruled in the negative on the 1995 Section 201 petition because
of the way in which the petitioners defined the industry.3 3 The petitioners
attempting to seek relief for the fresh winter tomato industry, defined the
industry as those fresh tomatoes produced in the January to April market
window. 34 The U.S. ITC refused to recognize a seasonal industry, indicating that the case had to be decided on the U.S. industry that included all
domestic production grown throughout the entire year.35 The ITC also
found it difficult to support provisional relief on the grounds that a final
determination would be just as timely as provisional relief given that relief
from either outcome for the industry defined in the petition would be in the
following season.36 Petitioners withdrew the Section 201 petition following

27. Id. at 3-4.
28. Fresh Winter Tomatoes, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,883 (1995); see 19 U.S.C. § 2252(d) (1994).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 2251.
30. Id. § 2252(d).
31. Id. § 2252(d)(1)(C).
32. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L.100-418, § 1401(d), 102
Stat. 1107, 1129 (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906).
33. Fresh Winter Tomatoes, USITC Pub. 2881, Inv. No. TA-201-64 (Apr. 1995) (prov.).
34. Id. at 1-8.
35. Id. at 1-8 to 1-14.
36. Id. at 1-19 to 1-21.
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the outcome on the provisional relief phase, feeling the outcome in the
provisional phase made it difficult to win an affirmative in the final
determination of the Section 201 petition.37
Imports increased again in the 1995-1996 season, and prices were again
depressed. A Section 201 petition was filed with the ITC 38 and an antidumping petition was filed with Commerce in March 1996. 39 These petitions
sought relief for the U.S. bell pepper and fresh tomato industries, accepting
the definition of a U.S. domestic industry as defined by the ITC in the 1995
Fresh Winter Tomatoes case. 40 The allegation of the petitions was that
serious injury had been felt by the U.S. bell pepper and tomato industries and
that the injury was caused by increased imports. 4'
Mexican producers countered the petitions with claims that while serious
injury may have occurred to U.S. growers, that injury was mainly in Florida
and was caused by weather problems in Florida, while changes in market
shares for tomatoes were caused by increased demand for Mexico's "higher
quality tomatoes" and Florida's reluctance to improve their product quality
with improved technology. 42 The ITC decided in a 4-1 vote in July 1996
that increased imports were not causing serious injury to U.S. producers.4 3
Their opinion stated that they failed to recognize serious injury to the U.S.
industry.44 They failed to recognize serious injury even though data they
collected from fresh tomato growers and shippers indicated that 75% of the
growers surveyed lost money during the period of the investigation, with
losses averaging 40% of sales.45 The ITC chose to ignore these data
because it had concluded that these data were, "on the whole, inconclusive,"
and that no injury had occurred because U.S. domestic acreage and
production in 1995 were about equal to that in 1991, the first year in the
period of investigation.46 The dissenting commissioner, Commissioner Lynn
Bragg, wrote in her opinion of the case, "In my view, by making a negative
determination in these investigations, the [ITC] has set a standard for
47
obtaining relief under Section 201 that is virtually impossible to satisfy.,
The petitioners chose to move forward with an antidumping petition on
fresh tomatoes even following the negative determination from ITC on the
37. Fresh Winter Tomatoes, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,248 (1995) (termination).
38. Fresh Tomatoes and Bell Peppers, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,875 (1996).
39. Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. 15,968 (1996).
40. Fresh Tomatoes and Bell Peppers, 61 Fed. Reg. at 13,875.
41. Id.; Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. at 15,968.
42. VanSickle, supra note 3, at 4-5.
43. Fresh Tomatoes and Bell Peppers, USITC Pub. 2985, Inv. No. TA-201-66, at 1-5, 1-19
(Aug. 1996).
44. Id. at I-5.
45. VanSickle, supra note 3, at 5.
46. Fresh Tomatoes and Bell Peppers, USITC Pub. 2985, at 1-14.
47. Id. at 1-19.
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Section 201 case because the standard for judging injury in an antidumping
petition is lower than in a Section 201 petition. An affirmative determination
in a 201 case requires that the domestic industry must be materially injured
and that the injury must be by reason of dumped imports.4
The injury
standard in a dumping case requires "harm which is not inconsequential,
immaterial, or unimportant." 49 This differs significantly from the "serious
injury" requirement in Section 201 cases.
An investigation by Commerce in the antidumping petition led to a
preliminary determination in October 1996 that fresh tomatoes from Mexico
were being, or were likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair
value.5" Commerce estimated dumping margins from their investigation
ranging from 4.16% to 188.45% with an average of 17.5%.51 The next step
in the antidumping case would have been hearings to be held in January
1997 by ITC to determine whether sales at less than fair value have caused,
or are likely to cause, material injury to the U.S. industry.52 A positive
determination from those hearings would have resulted in antidumping duties
being collected on Mexican imports of fresh tomatoes.53
The Department of Commerce initiated negotiations with the Mexican
growers following their preliminary determination to develop a compromise
agreement that would stop sales at less than fair value. 54 These discussions
resulted in the suspension agreement that was announced in October 1996
and was signed by Mexican growers representing 88% of their volume.55
The agreement stipulates that Mexican growers will not sell fresh tomatoes
for less than 20.68 cents/pound and that they will not dump tomatoes in the
U.S. market with dumping margins more than 15% of that margin measured
by Commerce during their investigation.56
The suspension agreement puts the antidumping case on hold. 57 The
agreement is for a five-year period. 58 Violations of the agreement can reopen the antidumping case at the point where the compromise had stopped
the case. 59 This agreement is of benefit to growers and to consumers in

48. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (1994).
49. Id. § 1677.
50. Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and
Postponement of Final Determination: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed Reg. 56,608
(1996) [hereinafter Postponement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico].
51. Id. at 56,615.
52. Id.
53. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2).
54. Postponement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,608.
55. Suspension: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,618-19.
56. Id. at 56,618.
57. Id. at 56,619.
58. Id. at 56,620.
59. Id.
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both countries. Some may be skeptical about the benefits of this agreement,
but it is hard to identify anything less than benefits if the agreement is
allowed to succeed.
Growers and shippers of fresh tomatoes in the United States will benefit
from this agreement because it should stop price-depressing surges of imports
from Mexico. Mexico has been the primary source of imports that have
caused low prices for U.S. producers and shippers. 6° This agreement serves
as a throttle on the market to keep imports from flooding U.S. markets and
depressing prices. It does not guarantee profits for producers. Production
costs for U.S. producers exceed the minimum price of US$5.17 per 25-pound
carton. Production costs for Florida growers ranged from US$7.06 to
US$8.45 per 25-pound carton in the 1994-1995 season. 6' While the
minimum price will not cover production cost for U.S. growers, it does
assure that Mexican growers and shippers will cover their variable costs of
harvesting, packing, and marketing in U.S. markets.
The agreement also assures that Mexican growers will not dump
tomatoes on U.S. markets. Dumping occurs when foreign countries sell
product in international markets for less than fair market value.62 Fair
market value is determined by the price in the home country.63 If that price
cannot be measured, then a constructed value representing their cost of
production and marketing is used to determine fair market value. 64 The
dumping margins estimated by Commerce indicate that Mexico was in fact
selling tomatoes in the United States for less than fair value.65 This was not
done necessarily out of malice, but often because of poor marketing practices.
Mexican producers grow tomatoes and expect to sell in U.S. and Canadian
markets. They grow, harvest, and pack their tomatoes and then ship them to
the border without considering market conditions. Distributors at the U.S.
border then sell the tomatoes and return the sales revenue after deducting
their expenses. Marketing does not occur until the product reaches the
border. The marketing channel for Mexican tomatoes has worked much like
a pipeline without a control valve. When harvesting begins, the tomatoes are
shipped to the U.S. market to be sold regardless of the volume in the
marketing channel. Price should serve as a control valve, but because the
price is not established until long after the product enters the U.S. market, the
pipeline flows unchecked. Establishing a minimum price for Mexican

60. Fresh Tomatoes and Bell Peppers, USITC Pub. 2985, at 1-5.
61. Scott A. Smith & Timoty G. Taylor, Production Cost for Selected Vegetables in
Florida, 1994-95, U. FLA. INST. FOOD & AGR. Sci., E195-1, at 21-27 (Aug. 1995).
62. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34).
63. See id. § 1677b(a)(l).
64. See id. § 1677b(e).
65. See Postponement: Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,615.
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imports of fresh tomatoes should give shippers the incentive to monitor the
market in order to assure the price does not drop below the minimum price.
When the market approaches the minimum price, the Mexican shippers will
have to either slow the flow of tomatoes they ship to the United States or
dump them at the border after incurring the additional expenses of transportation to the border and handling by the border distributors. If they do
neither of these and sell below the minimum price, they will violate the terms
of the suspension agreement and risk imposition of antidumping duties.
The suspension agreement should cause Mexican shippers to consider
market conditions before shipping produce to destination markets. Minimum
price guarantees should cause them to monitor the market and control the
flow of produce before incurring the added expense of transportation and
handling. In addition, the agreement not to dump product should cause them
to consider Mexican domestic markets before shipping directly to the border.
In effect, the agreement should benefit Mexican producers by insuring that
they do not sell product below the variable costs of harvesting, packing, and
marketing. It also forces them to consider alternative markets and gives them
an opportunity to capitalize on the best markets available for their products.
U.S. and Mexican consumers also should benefit from this agreement.
U.S. consumers should benefit because it provides an opportunity for both
U.S. and Mexican producers to remain in the market. Having both U.S. and
Mexican producers remain in the market should provide consumers with
continuity and choice, something that would not be available if one source
were unable to continue. A significant downsizing of the U.S. industry was
imminent without some form of compromise. The agreement was reached
too late in the planning horizon for many Florida growers, who lacked faith
that a fair agreement could be reached. As a result, tomato plantings in
Florida were down nearly twenty-five percent in 1996.66 The successful
implementation of this agreement should remove some of the risk U.S.
growers face in the production of fresh tomatoes.
Mexican consumers also should benefit from this agreement. For most
Mexican producers, the Mexican domestic market has been the market of
second choice, a residual market. Supplies in Mexico have been constrained
because of this practice, resulting in higher prices for Mexican consumers.
Forcing Mexican shippers to consider the domestic market should result in
more continuity of supplies for Mexican consumers and lower the prices that
they must pay.
This agreement is rare in that benefits should come to all producers and
consumers of fresh tomatoes. Removing risk from the market will foster a
more efficient production and marketing system. The agreement provides

66. FLORIDA TOMATO

COMMTEE, ANNUAL REPORT
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space for growers and shippers to develop and adopt new technologies to
improve their efficiency and quality of product.
This agreement is fair in that no producer will be a loser. The benefits
for Mexican shippers that will result from improved marketing practices are
not to their disadvantage. Florida growers continued the initiative toward
more efficient marketing practices by imposing provisions on their own
industry similar to those that the agreement imposes on Mexican shippers. 67
The Florida Tomato Growers Exchange adopted a minimum effective floor
price of US$5.35 per 25-pound carton for all tomatoes they ship.6 8 The
Florida Tomato Growers Exchange is a cooperative of Florida growers whose
members produce more than ninety percent of the volume of fresh tomatoes
shipped from Florida. 69 Each grower sells their tomatoes through the
Exchange which provides them an opportunity to reap the benefits of
improved marketing practices and guarantees that Florida will do its part in
providing a more stable market for growers and consumers.7 ° California
growers adopted a similar policy for the 1997 season. 7'
The changes that are necessary, however, do not stop at this level. The
principles of this suspension agreement should work and will benefit all
producers and consumers. It is time to call a truce in the Great Tomato War
between Mexico and Florida. After experiencing growth during the 1980s,72
demand for fresh tomatoes has remained flat over the decade of the 1990s.
The fresh tomato industry needs to work on programs to expand the demand
for fresh tomatoes in U.S. and foreign markets. Being among the largest
suppliers in the world, Mexican and U.S. growers and shippers should work
together to refuel the growth in demand for their products. The suspension
agreement can and should lead to more cooperation between them. There
always will be competition in this market, but growers and shippers should
capitalize on the resource advantages they control and work to enlarge the pie
to be split between competitors. Mexico most likely will continue to hold
an advantage with cheaper labor, but U.S. producers hold advantages with
proximity and technology development. Florida growers are located in one
of the best markets in the world for fresh produce, allowing them to take
advantage of lower marketing costs. Florida growers also have institutions
in place to develop and implement new technologies that capitalize on their
resource advantages.
The major advantage of this agreement is that it provides an opportunity

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

72. VanSickle, supra note 3, at 5.
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for growers and shippers from the United States and Mexico to give
consumers adequate supplies of high-quality product at reasonable prices.
Everyone wins with this agreement. It may be time to call this battle a draw
and move on to bigger and better fights, such as the battle to increase
demand for fresh tomatoes. That is a battle that also will benefit everybody.
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